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Abstract—The concept of a decentralized ledger usu-
ally implies that each node of a blockchain network
stores the entire blockchain. However, in the case of
popular blockchains, which each weigh several hun-
dreds of GB, the large amount of data to be stored
can incite new or low-capacity nodes to run lightweight
clients. Such nodes do not participate to the global
storage effort and can result in a centralization of the
blockchain by very few nodes, which is contrary to the
basic concepts of a blockchain.
To avoid this problem, we propose new low storage
nodes that store a reduced amount of data generated
from the blockchain by using erasure codes. The prop-
erties of this technique ensure that any block of the
chain can be easily rebuild from a small number of
such nodes. This system should encourage low storage
nodes to contribute to the storage of the blockchain
and to maintain decentralization despite of a globally
increasing size of the blockchain. This system paves the
way to new types of blockchains which would only be
managed by low capacity nodes.
I. Introduction
One of the most interesting properties of blockchains is
their decentralized nature allowing to avoid central author-
ities. Classically, each node participating to the blockchain
must maintain it by participating to the consensus when
inserting a new block and by storing the entire blockchain.
However, the success of blockchains such as Bitcoin or
Ethereum has highlighted a scalability problem. Indeed,
the increasing size of these blockchains implies important
efforts by medium capacity nodes:
1) CPU: each transaction has to be processed by every
node.
2) Storage: the size of many popular blockchains is con-
siderably increasing, which implicates an important
storage effort for classic nodes.
3) Network load: Points 1) and 2) can lead to a reduced
number of nodes storing the entire blockchain. This
could increase the network load for the remaining
full nodes.
Several solutions were recently proposed to cope with
the general scalability problem of blockchains. For exam-
ple, the Ethereum team [1] proposes a mechanism allowing
to increase the blockchain’s throughput. This solution
consequently reduces the amount of nodes verifying each
transaction without impacting the global security level.
Doing so allows to process more transactions in parallel.
Other solutions use auxiliary channels to debottleneck
the network and save storage space, like Plasma Cash or
lightning network [2], [3].
Considering the storage scalability problem, the most
frequent solution consists in nodes running a lightweight
client, thereby reducing their required storage effort. A
side effect of this solution is an important network and pro-
cessing load on full nodes satisfying light client requests.
From the storage point of view, it makes sense to
compare blockchains with distributed storage systems like
Cloud or Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems. Indeed, such sys-
tems also store large amounts of data replicated on several
servers. All these systems do not use the same solutions
but some global strategies can be observed. For highly
requested (hot-) data, replication is the most used solution.
But for low requested (cold-) data, erasure coding [4] is
often used. The interest of this solution is the capacity of
improving the trade-off between storage effort, availability
and reliability.
To the best of our knowledge, blockchains only use data
replication. The aim of this paper is to propose the use
of erasure codes in order to store the blockchain. To do
so, we introduce a new type of node, an erasure code-
based low storage node, which stores coded fragments for
each block of the blockchain. The main benefit is to allow
a reduction of the storage effort required by each node.
This should encourage nodes with low storage capacity to
participate to the storage effort of the blockchain and thus
result in two other benefits which are 1) the contribution to
maintaining the decentralized property of the blockchain
and 2) the reduction of network load on each node by
multiplying the number of nodes.
This paper is structured as follows. First, Section II
describes some related works concerning blockchain stor-
age mechanisms and erasure codes for distributed storage
systems. Then, Sections III and IV respectively present a
high level and low-level description of erasure-code based
low storage nodes, the main contribution of this paper.
After, Sections V and VI present the interest of our low
storage blockchain node and an analysis of the available
parameters of our system. Section VII introduces some
possible applications of our system. Finally, Section VIII
concludes this paper and proposes some perspectives.
II. Related works
Let us consider blockchains as a sequence of variable
sized blocks, virtually connected by their respective hashes
and stored on a peer-to-peer network composed of several
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types of nodes. The first type, called full nodes, stores
the entire blockchain (cf. Fig. 1). The second type, called
lightweight nodes, only stores the most recent blocks and
the hashes of every block of the chain. This type of node
allows to participate to a blockchain without storing the
entire chain when the size of the blockchain becomes
important. In the rest of this section we will discuss three
solutions allowing to face important data storage.
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
Node 1
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
Node 2
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
Node 3
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
Node 4
Fig. 1: Traditional blockchain
A. Replicated systems
A first solution allowing to reduce the required storing
capacity of every node consists in storing blocks among
the nodes, in such a way that every block continues to
be sustained by several nodes but not by all. A naive
implementation of this solution is presented in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2: Distributed replication blockchain
If one of the nodes storing a block becomes unavailable,
the block continues to be stored by others. However, the
global availability of this block is drastically reduced. In
this situation, malicious people could be tempted to target
parts of the blockchain that are poorly replicated.
B. Light nodes
A second solution to storage limitation is offered by
light clients. Many blockchains define their own type of
light client [5]–[8]. Light clients do not store the entire
blockchain, but only parts of it, generally the most recent
blocks. As an example we can cite Simplified Payment
Verification (SPV) which was originally designed by bit-
coin’s creator in his whitepaper [9]. SPV allows nodes
with limited resources to participate to a blockchain and
perform payment verification, while only storing block
headers. The node can not verify transactions by itself,
but it requests block-content when necessary and uses the
merkle tree to confirm the integrity of the data it received.
Nodes running light clients present many problems:
• They don’t store every block, so availability is not
improved. If all nodes would run such clients, the
overall blockchain availability would be endangered.
• They never verify the entire blockchain, but instead
rely their trust on other full nodes.
C. Erasure code and distributed storage systems
A third solution to data storage is inspired from classic
distributed storage systems. Such systems often use era-
sure codes, like in RAID (Redundant Array of Independent
Disks) [10], Clouds [4] or P2P systems [11]. The main
idea is to encode the data into coded chunks which are
distributed over several nodes of the system. The Storj
system [12] uses a similar concept by storing coded and
encrypted data in a P2P network that can be connected
to a blockchain. The Swarm project [13] also uses erasure
codes in a blockchain context, it’s purpose is to provide a
decentralized and redundant store for dapp code and data,
on the ethereum blockchain.
In all these systems, erasure coding improves the trade-
off between data availability and the amount of stored
data.
To describe the concept behind erasure codes, let us
first consider a replicated system, represented in Fig. 3,
which stores 3 data blocks b1, b2 and b3, these blocks are
simply replicated for redundancy. Here, if a block and its
replicated block are deleted or at least unavailable at a
given time, this block can no longer be recovered.
7 7 7b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3
Data blocks Copy of data blocks
b2 lost!
Fig. 3: Traditional system
When using erasure codes, the 3 redundancy blocks
store linear combinations of the data blocks. With the
same block unavailability, as shown in Fig. 4, we can
observe that the 3 blocks can be recovered from the 3 avail-
able blocks by performing the inverse linear operations (we
assume that the linear system is invertible).
Let’s conclude that the use of erasure codes provides a
better availability than classic data replication with the
same amount of storage. The objective of this paper is
to improve blockchain storage scalability by using erasure
codes.
III. Low storage nodes
In section II we described two types of nodes, full
nodes and lightweight nodes already deployed in many
blockchains.
In this paper we introduce a new type of node, which
is called Low Storage (LS) node. They are described in
the next paragraph. The way they recover a given block
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Fig. 4: Simple example of coded storage system
and the way they interact with the blockchain network is
presented in the following paragraphs.
A. Principle
The main contribution of LS nodes to the blockchain
system is to store only some coded fragments of each block.
These fragments are obtained by first splitting a block into
fixed size fragments and then generating linear combina-
tions of these fragments. Note that the combinations are
specific to each block and to each node. This means that
when several nodes store coded fragments from the same
block, these will necessarily be different.
A detailed description of these operations is presented
in Section IV. The number of coded fragments stored by
an LS node can vary according to different factors such
as the age of the block or the storage capabilities of the
node.
B. Block recovery
When an LS node wants to recover a block from coded
fragments stored by different LS nodes, it shall download
coded fragments corresponding to the desired block upon
several LS nodes. When the amount of coded fragments
downloaded is more important than the amount of frag-
ments the block was initially split into, the node can access
the block by performing the inverse linear combinations.
C. Integration of a new LS node in the network
When an LS node wants to join the network, it needs to
download all the blocks of the blockchain. This can be done
from one or more trusted full nodes or from several LS
nodes. For each block, it verifies its validity according to
the previous block and generates its own coded fragments.
Then, it removes the complete block and only stores the
hash of the block and the coded fragments. Since the
operations done on a block are independent from the other
blocks, it can process the entire blockchain in sequence.
This has the advantage of not needing to store the entire
blockchain at once, therefore LS nodes are able to verify
the entire blockchain with a reduced storage capacity.
IV. Coding the blockchain
In this section we will present the technical aspects of
coding block fragments. Firstly, we will discuss how we ap-
ply erasure coding to our system. The coding system in our
system follows the same principle as coding mechanisms
used in distributed storage systems (cf. Fig. 4). Secondly
we will present how a node can recover a block based on
coded fragments.
Before describing the coding operation, let us first define
some notations. We denote by N (i) the nodes of the
network, where i is an unique identifier characterizing each
node. We denote by B(j) the jth block of the blockchain.
We consider that the first block is B(0).
Let us denote by sB the maximum size of a block
of the blockchain. Let us define two integers k and r
respectively corresponding to the number of fragments of
a block and the number of coded fragments stored by a
node. The choice of the values of k and r will be discussed
in Section VI.
A. Coding the data
When a node wants to code a block B(j), it must first
split the block in k fragments before applying a linear
operation in order to obtain r coded fragments (cf. Fig 5).
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Fig. 5: Block coding process
To generate r coded fragments from block B(j),
the node N (i) first splits the block into k fragments
F
(j)
0 , F
(j)
1 , . . . , F
(j)
k−1. If necessary, before splitting the
block, it is padded with zeros up to sB in order to have a
fixed fragment size sB/k. Then, the node N (i) initializes a
pseudo-random number generator with a seed defined as
the concatenation of the binary expressions of i and j and
generates the pseudo-random sequence {α(i,j)0 , . . . , α(i,j)k.r−1}
of k.r coefficients in the finite field F2m . We propose to set
m := 8 because the field F28 is generally considered as
a good tradeoff between the complexity of its operations
and the diversity it provides. This choice will be explained
in Section VI. In practical, the 256 elements of this finite
field are associated by a bijection to the 256 bytes.
To build the coded fragment F(i,j)u , where
0 ≤ u ≤ r − 1, the node considers the k coefficients
{α(i,j)k.u , . . . , α(i,j)(k+1).u−1} and performs the following linear
combination:
F(i,j)u = α
(i,j)
k.u .F
(j)
0 + . . . , α
(i,j)
(k+1).u−1.F
(j)
k−1
F
(1,j)
0
F
(1,j)
1
F
(1,j)
2
F
(1,j)
3
F
(1,j)
4
F
(2,j)
0
F
(2,j)
1
F
(2,j)
2
F
(3,j)
0
F
(3,j)
1
F
(4
,j
)
0
F
(1
,j
)
0
F
(2
,j
)
0
F
(2
,j
)
1
F
(3
,j
)
0
α
(4,j)
0
α
(4,j)
1
α
(4,j)
2
α
(4,j)
3
α
(4,j)
4
α
(2,j)
5
α
(2,j)
6
α
(2,j)
7
α
(2,j)
8
α
(2,j)
9
α
(1,j)
0
α
(1,j)
1
α
(1,j)
2
α
(1,j)
3
α
(1,j)
4
α
(3,j)
0
α
(3,j)
1
α
(3,j)
2
α
(3,j)
3
α
(3,j)
4
α
(2,j)
0
α
(2,j)
1
α
(2,j)
2
α
(2,j)
3
α
(2,j)
4
-1
× = B(j)
Fig. 6: Block recovery process
From a more practical point of view, if f (j)l,v denotes
the finite field element associated to the vth byte of the
fragment B(j)l , then the vth byte of the coded fragment
F
(i,j)
u is defined by the finite field element f(i,j)u,v computed
as follows:
f(i,j)u,v = α
(i,j)
k.u .f
(j)
0,v + . . . ,+α
(i,j)
(k+1).u−1.f
(j)
k−1,v
A more detailed presentation of the linear combinations of
byte packets in finite fields is presented in [14].
Finally, the node removes the block B(j) and replaces it
by the coded fragments F(i,j)0 , . . . ,F
(i,j)
r−1 ..
B. Recovering the data
Practically, a node N (i) downloads coded fragments
F
(i0,j)
0 , . . . ,F
(ir−1,j)
r−1 from several nodes N (i0), . . . , N (ir−1).
Note that it is possible to request multiple coded fragments
from the same node, as illustrated in Fig. 6. Since the node
N (i) knows the values of i0, . . . , ir−1 and j, it is able to ini-
tialize the correct pseudo random number generator with
the binary expressions of i0, . . . , ir−1 and j and thus can
regenerate the coefficients α used when N (i0), . . . , N (ir−1)
built their coded fragments. So, N (i) knows the r linear
equations used to build the r coded fragments from the
initial fragments. After downloading a sufficient number
of coded fragments, the node will have enough equations
to invert the linear system and recover the k fragments
(and thus the block) from the coded fragments.
In Section VI we will show that, with the field F28 , in
most cases the linear system can be inverted as soon as k
coded fragments are downloaded.
Note that non coded fragments can also be used in the
decoding process. Indeed, they can be considered as a
trivial linear combination of the fragments of the block
(with α = 1 for the corresponding fragment and α = 0 for
the other fragments).
V. Low storage node interest
The main objective of our system is to allow any node
to contribute to an entire blockchain with a reduced
storage effort. In this section we will discuss the different
interests of our system compared to traditional blockchain
nodes. Firstly we will compare the storage effort required
by traditional vs coded blockchains. We will show how
low storage blockchain nodes can relieve full nodes, and
improve trust in the network. Secondly we will show how
our system can improve the information security in terms
of availability and integrity.
A. Storage effort scalability
Let c be the compression factor, defined by c := k/r.
Note that a node that stores r coded fragments must
download k− r extra coded fragments in order to recover
a block. So, the higher the compression factor, the more
coded fragments the node must download to be able to
decode the entire block. The choice of these parameters
will be discussed in section VI.
When r = k, c = 1 which means that the storage
effort is not reduced. In this case, the data can be rebuild
without downloading additional coded fragments. When
r decreases down to 1, the compression factor increases
up to k. Considering that each node must store at least
one coded fragment per block, the maximum compression
factor for each block is k.
One of the interests of our system is its scalability.
Indeed, each node can adapt r according to, for example,
the age of a block by simply removing some of its stored
coded fragments without re-calculating them.
Moreover, the number of coded fragments generated and
stored on each node can independently be defined by each
node, and should be adapted according to the desired
storage effort of each node.
B. Availability
One of the main goals of our system is to improve the
global availability and sustainability of a blockchain. In
order to achieve this, our system reduces the storage effort
required by a single node while participating to the global
storage effort of the entire blockchain.
With our system we consider almost any node stores at
least one coded fragment of every block. Thereby, even if
each block is not stored in its initial form, every block
is entirely stored among the different nodes, each one
storing different fragments. In most cases, the initial block
can be recovered by combining any k coded fragments
provided by any node of the network. For a system with
a large amount of nodes, any node can leave the system
or be unreachable without significantly impacting the
availability.
To evaluate the availability, let us denote n the number
of nodes. Since each node can store a variable number
of fragments, we note ri the number of fragments stored
by ith node. We assume that the ri can be modeled as
realizations of an independent discrete random variable
following a probability distribution f . Since a block can be
recovered when at least k coded fragments are available,
the probability Pc of block irrecoverability from coded
fragments is :
Pc = p
(
n−1∑
i=0
ri < k
)
=
k−1∑
u=0
p
(
n−1∑
i=0
ri = u
)
=
k−1∑
u=0
f∗
n
(u) (1)
where f∗n =
n times︷ ︸︸ ︷
f ∗ f ∗ · · · ∗ f and ∗ the convolution be-
tween two distribution probabilities.
To compare with a system based on random replication
nodes (cf. Fig. 2) with the same level of storage, we assume
that each node stores each block with a probability of 1/c.
The probability that a block is not stored by a node is
thus 1 − 1/c. By assuming that each node independently
chooses which block to store, the probability Pr that a
block is stored by no node at all is equal to:
Pr = (1− 1
c
)n (2)
Let us compare these two systems with a numerical
example. Let us assume that, in the coded system, the
number r of coded fragments stored by each node follows
a geometric distribution fp(r) = p.(1 − p)r−1. We then
have:
f∗
n
p (u) =
(u− 1)!
(n− 1)!(u− n)! .p
n.(1− p)u−n (3)
In our example, we assume that k = 100 and that the
average compression factor of the block is c = 20. So, on
average, each node stores r = 5 coded fragments. Since the
mean of a geometric distribution of parameter p is 1/p, we
have p = 0.2, as illustrated in Fig. 7.
With these parameters, Fig. 8 shows the probability of
block irrecoverability from coded fragments for the two
systems, by using Eqs. 1 and 3 for the coded system and
Eq. 2 for the random replication system.
With the coded system and this probability law, starting
from 37 nodes the probability to access a block equals 1
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Fig. 7: Probability for one node to store r fragments, with
geometric distribution of parameter p = 0.2
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Fig. 8: Probability one chosen block is irrecoverable, de-
pending on n, with k = 100
(with 5 digits precision), but with the randomly replicated
it is only from 238 nodes.
Regardless of the real probability law, with low storage
nodes every node has to store at least r = 1 fragments, so
with only k nodes we are sure to access the block.
Moreover, if we consider every node has the same
probability of failure, using our mechanism, the overall
probability of blockchain unavailability will drop. Indeed,
considering the network storage capacity remains identi-
cal, our method distributes data over many more nodes,
thereby distributing and reducing the global failure rate
of the blockchain.
C. Integrity
This section will discuss how our system not only con-
serves the integrity of the blockchain but can improve trust
by making data tampering more difficult.
1) Hash-collision with coded fragments: By construc-
tion, the integrity of a blockchain is guaranteed by the
hash contained in each block. This hash validates the
previous block of the chain and mechanically the entire
blockchain. Therefore, any malicious node wanting to
tamper a block of the blockchain would need to find a
hash-collision in order to conserve the same hash result
for the tampered block.
Since the malicious node can only tamper some of the
coded fragments used for the decoding process, he must
figure out which correct fragments will be used for the
decoding process. Then, he must search a hash-collision
such that the result of the decoding process of the correct
and the tampered fragments has the same hash as the
initial block. This problem is at least as difficult as the
classical hash-collision problem. So the use of erasure codes
does not only reduce but rather increases the integrity of
the system.
2) Malicious node identification: Erasure codes also
provide solutions to identify malicious nodes tampering
blocks. Tampered blocks will not be compatible and coher-
ent with any set of k valid coded fragments. This property
allows each node to check the validity of other nodes
and thereby improves the global security of the system.
Moreover, this would allow the use of fraud proofs to
report malicious nodes like detailed in [15].
3) Blockchain verification: As explained in IV-A, the
seed used by the pseudo-random number generator to
generate the coefficients of the linear combination depends
on the identity of the node. When decoding a block, each
node uses the seeds belonging to the nodes from which the
coded fragments were downloaded. When storing coded
fragments of a block, these are necessarily re-coded with
the local seed.
When a node wants to download coded fragments and
decode the block, it uses i, the unique node identifier to
regenerate the coefficients.
The only way to obtain coded fragments coded with
the correct coefficients, is to entirely code them from
plain blocks. If a node does not follow this principle, the
regenerated coefficients won’t match and the decoding
process will fail. This constraint forces each low storage
node to verify the entire blockchain, which in turn will
improve the overall integrity.
D. Network load balancing
We expect low storage nodes will contribute to a gain of
the number of nodes, thereby improving the distribution
of the blockchain over it’s network.
As an example let us consider 1000 light nodes each
connected with a 10Mbps network interface and only 5
full nodes serving the entire blockchain. In this situation
each full node would have to be able to serve blocks at:
10Mbps× 1000
5 = 2Gbps
in order to satisfy the 1000 light nodes. With our method,
if we consider each node stores 5 (k = 100, c = 20) coded
fragments, with the same storage effort allowing 5 full
nodes, our network can provide 100 (5 ∗ c = 5 ∗ 20) low
storage nodes. In this situation each node would initiate 20
connections at 0.5Mbps (10Mbps / 20) which totals 20000
connections for all the nodes and therefore each full node
would have to be able to serve blocks at only:
10Mbps
20 × 20000
1000 = 100Mbps
in order to satisfy the 1000 nodes. This simple example
clearly illustrates how our low storage nodes can decongest
the network. Naturally connection establishment time and
other overhead must also be considered when realizing a
full network load study.
VI. Analysis of the parameters
On each node, each block, and thus k fragments, are
replaced by r coded fragments. One of the challenges
is to determine k and r, with the best compromise be-
tween compression and complexity. In this section, we will
present some consequences when varying these parame-
ters. Every blockchain and every type of node is different,
it is therefore impossible to determine a generic value for
k and r but a compromise must be found according to
the system’s constraints. Before discussing fragmentation
and compression factor we will consider finite field size
and processing complexity, since these two aspects will
influence the choice of k and r.
A. Size of the finite field
The choice of the finite field used to perform linear
combinations mainly impacts two parameters: the proba-
bility of block recovery from downloaded coded fragments
(which is better with a large finite field) and the encoding
and decoding complexities (which is smaller with a small
finite field).
Reference [16] shows that when the coefficients of the
linear combinations are chosen in the field F2m , the
probability of recovering a block from k + s downloaded
fragments can be approximated by 1− 2−m.(s+1).
Classically, for practical implementations, the possible
sizes of the finite field q are 22i , i.e. 2, 4, 16, 256, 65536.
Since extremely fast implementations can be developed for
2m = 256 [17], we propose to use this value in our system.
B. Processing complexity
The complexity of encoding consists in multiplying a
k × r-matrix by the k original fragments. Then, there is
k × r × sB/k = r × sB operations. So, the encoding com-
plexity does not depend on k, but only on r.
For decoding, the complexity consists in inverting a
k × k-matrix, and then multiplying it by the k coded
fragments. The pseudo-random matrix inversion has a
complexity in O(k3). So the number of operations is
O(k3) + k2 × sB/k= O(k3) + k × sB and thus depends
only on k. If the size of the block is large compared to
k, then the matrix-vector multiplication (k× block size) is
the most complex operation.
Fig. 9 shows the encoding and decoding speeds of 1MB
blocks, with different values of k and r. We used the
erasure code implementation of [17] with avx2 instructions
on a core i7-6700@3.2 GHz CPU. This graph allows to
conclude that the processing cost is negligible. Indeed,
coding speed is always greater than 15 Gbps for r ≤ 20.
Decoding speed is lower, but greater than 3.5 Gbps for
k ≤ 50 and equals to 1.5 Gbps for k = 100.
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Fig. 9: Encoding and decoding speed, with block
size = 1Mb
C. Fragmentation
As described in Section IV-A, each node, in order to
generate its r coded fragments, will split the initial block
into k fragments. The choice of this parameter can be
different for each blockchain, but it must be the same
for every user of the same blockchain. Table I shows the
different arguments when choosing k.
TABLE I: Choosing k
Argument k
Decoding complexity ↘
Compression factor flexibility ↗
Max compression ↗
Overall we can conclude that k should be chosen as big
as possible, without exceeding 2m2 = 128 (2m = 256, size
of our finite field). If sB , the maximum size of a block of
the blockchain, is too small, it possible to group a small
amount of blocks before coding them. Doing so will allow
to increase k and take a better benefit of low storage nodes.
D. Compression factor
The compression factor c = k/r indicates by how much
the storage effort of a node adopting the low storage
mechanism can be reduced. Considering k is system-wide
determined, c can only be chosen by varying r. Table II
shows the different arguments when choosing r.
TABLE II: Choosing r
Argument r
Blockchain availability ↗
Regular block recovery ↗
Encoding complexity ↘
High compression ↘
Network load ↗
The choice of r is up to the end user and will depend
on the type of user. Choosing r high will improve block
recovery and reduce network load, also will this improve
the overall blockchain availability as increasing r increases
the storage effort of a node. Choosing r low, will reduce
coding complexity and compression factor. Globally r
must be chosen according to the node’s capacities.
VII. Application
This section will discuss some possible applications of
our system. Firstly we will study how our system can be
adopted in existing blockchains. Secondly we will examine
how our system could pave the way to blockchains on IoT
devices.
A. Positioning with existing system blockchains
Low storage nodes can be the basis of new blockchains,
but they can also be adapted in existing systems. Since our
system only stores blocks in their coded form, any system
adopting low storage nodes should not require a frequent
access to old blocks in order to remain efficient. In this
part, we will explain how low storage nodes can be used
in Ethereum and Bitcoin blockchains, and how to avoid
abundant access to old blocks.
1) Ethereum: The Ethereum blockchain can be consid-
ered as a state transition system. Each state reflects the
ownership status of all existing tokens at a given time.
The Ethereum’s state machine begins with a genesis state.
Each time new transactions are processed and validated,
a new final state including these transactions is added to
the system. At any time, this final state reflects the current
state of the Ethereum blockchain. The current state is a
single global truth, shared by every node.
Each node stores the most recent state, therefore older
blocks are not required to verify and process new trans-
actions. In this situation, access to older blocks is only
required by new nodes joining the network and wanting to
verify the entire blockchain. Consequently, older blocks are
rarely requested and can easily be coded without delaying
the system.
2) Bitcoin: The Bitcoin protocol does not implement
the exact same mechanism, but can also be seen as a state
transition system. Considering new low-storage nodes need
to verify the entire chain when joining the network, we
could imagine to set up a similar state transition system
as used by Ethereum.
There have been several proposals to form a special
tree to organize all unspent transaction outputs on the
network, called an Unused Output Tree (UOT) [8], [18].
The transaction outputs are hashed as a Merkle tree, and
the root hash is stored in the blockchain [19]. This system
allows to improve the security of SPV [9], because it is now
possible to verify with the UOT that a transaction has
not been spent in a subsequent transaction. In our case,
it seems coherent to entirely store unspent transaction
outputs, in a database for example, to have the equivalent
of the current state of the system, as used by Ethereum.
B. Internet of Things (IoT)
Considering our system allows to drastically reduce
storage effort required by a node without significantly
increasing CPU sollicitation, our system could be an im-
portant step towards running blockchains on IoT devices.
In order to examine this possibility we tested our system
on a Raspberry Pi. Raspberry Pis are small singleboard
computers using an ARM processor, they perfectly repre-
sent the processing capacity of an average IoT device or
smartphone.
Table III shows the encoding and decoding speeds of
1MB blocks, with different values for k and r, using neon
instructions on a Raspberry Pi 3b. The algorithm used
here does not implement parallel computing, so speeds
could be easily improved by using the four threads of the
quad-core ARM processor on our Raspberry Pi.
Considering the encoding complexity is only related to
r, we can observe the encoding speed is halved when r
is doubled. Therefore, we can estimate that the encoding
speed will be roughly 100Mbps when r = 40. In the same
way, decoding complexity is only related to k and we
can observe that the decoding speed is halved when k is
doubled.
The Raspberry Pi 3B we used integrates a 10/100 Mbps
Ethernet port. We have shown that the encoding speed
is above 100Mbps when r ≤ 40, and with k ≤ 50,
the decoding speed is in the same order of magnitude.
Therefore, when k ≤ 50 and r ≤ 40 the bottleneck of the
system is the network, and not the encoding process.
Overall we can conclude that our system is perfectly
compatible with low resource devices, while reducing the
required storage effort.
TABLE III: Coding data speed on Raspberry Pi 3b, with
block size = 1MB, in Mbps
K=25 K=50 K=100
encoding, r=5 708 706 689
encoding, r=10 362 363 355
decoding 146 82 43
VIII. Conclusion
The increasing popularity of blockchains reveals all the
possibilities a decentralized ledger can offer. Nonetheless
blockchains also have their limits and scalability rapidly
appears problematic.
In this paper, we introduce a new type of blockchain
node, called Low Storage node, with the aim of proposing
an alternative between light nodes and full nodes. This
type of node uses erasure codes in order to allow users with
reduced storage capacity to contribute to the blockchain,
without storing the entire blockchain, but instead only
linear combinated fragments of each block. Eventhough
blocks are no longer stored in their original form, they can
still be recovered by downloading fragments from other
nodes and performing the inverse linear operation.
We have shown that our system can improve the overall
availability of a blockchain without impacting data in-
tegrity. We believe our system will encourage new nodes
to participate to the network, thereby relieving existing
nodes. Moreover, CPU ressources required for the coding
process are negligible when coding at the same speed as
average home internet connections allow to download the
blockchain. We also tested our system on a nanocomputer,
proving it’s compatibility with low ressource IoT devices.
As future work we plan to further explore an IoT
compatible blockchain model. We also plan to study how
to exempt nodes from verifying the entire blockchain when
joining the network.
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